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Colombo: The Religious Liberty Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia

THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY JURISPRUDENCE
OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
RonaldJ. Colombo*
As might be expected, the religious liberty jurisprudence of the late
Justice Antonin Scalia is as unique as the man himself. It defies any
simplified characterization, and reflects an approach that is both
practical and principled. This Article will endeavor to explain Justice
Scalia's approach to religious liberty, and, in closing, briefly
prognosticate about the future of religious liberty in the United States in
the wake of Justice Scalia's passing.
As a threshold matter, it is important to define the term that is the
subject of this Article: religious liberty. By religious liberty, I refer,
primarily, to the rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.' As such, this Article's
focus will not be on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
although some discussion of the Establishment Clause will be
necessarily unavoidable.
Taken together, the Constitution's two religion clauses read as
follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."2 This terse text
has befuddled the courts, giving rise to a jurisprudence on matters of
religion that has been difficult to synthesize or predict.
Part of the difficulty stems from what appears to be a certain
tension between the two clauses. For on the one hand, the Establishment
Clause has commonly been interpreted as somewhat hostile towards
religious expression or activity-at least when the government, or some
other state actor, is implicated. On the other hand, the Free Exercise
Clause has commonly been interpreted as solicitous of religion, to the

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Distance Education, Maurice A. Deane School
of Law, Hofstra University. This Article is based upon remarks I delivered at the Nassau County
Bar Association, Mineola, N.Y., on May 24, 2017. I thank the Bar Association, and Professor
Anthony Sabino, in particular, for the invitation.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.

2. Id
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point of preferring religious conscience and conduct, in certain contexts,
over non-religious conscience and conduct.
Admittedly, another part of the difficulty stems from the fact that,
as Justice Scalia once wrote, the interpretation of the Constitution has
come to "rest upon the changeable philosophical predilections of the
Justices," rather than the "deep foundations in the historic practices of
[the American] people." 3 Thus, not only are the Constitution's religion
clauses somewhat opaque, but they have also been subject to
interpretation over the decades by a changing cast of Supreme Court
Justices, many of whom, some have suggested, have interpreted these,
and other, provisions of the Constitution as they would have liked them
to have been written-as opposed to how they actually were written.
Put differently, when one subscribes to the concept of a "living
Constitution"-a concept that Justice Scalia abhorred 5 constitutional
interpretation is less tightly tethered to the constitutional text itself,
and is such subject to a greater degree of drifting from one school of
thought to another.
But this is, in part, a digression. The key takeaway here is that the
proper interpretation of the First Amendment's religion clauses has
remained subject to substantial debate for generations.
With regard to the Free Exercise Clause, Justice Scalia attempted to
bring greater clarity to the Court's approach in his decision in
Employment Division v. Smith.' In so doing, he ushered in the modem

era of free exercise jurisprudence.
Prior to Employment Division v. Smith, it was not exactly clear how

far the protections of the Free Exercise Clause reached. There was
consensus that the Free Exercise Clause prohibited the government from
coercing or enjoining religious belief. There was also consensus that the
Free Exercise Clause prohibited the government from targeting a

3.

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia,

J., dissenting).

4. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY BY ANTONIN SCALIA 3, 38-41 (Amy

Gutmann ed., 1997).
5. Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution:Justice Anthony . Kennedv's Move
awayfrom a Conservative Methodology of ConstitutionalInterpretation,30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 25,

33 (2007).
6. Cf McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 890-91 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("What distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a shifting Supreme Court
majority is the absolutely indispensable requirement that judicial opinions be grounded in
consistently applied principle. That is what prevents judges from ruling now this way, now thatthumbs up or thumbs down-as their personal preferences dictate.").

7.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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particular religion, or religion generally, for negative, discriminatory
treatment. But after that, the consensus broke down.
According to one school of commentators, the Free Exercise Clause
protects nothing other than that which has just been described.'
Belief was sacrosanct, and with regard to conduct, the only prohibition
was on governmental attempts to circumscribe religious activity qua
religious activity.'
According to a group of historians and scholars, however, the
framers of the First Amendment specifically chose the words "free
exercise of religion," in lieu of narrower expressions such as religious
belief, or worship, to enshrine robust constitutional protections for
religiously motivated activity that go well beyond matters of belief or
worship per se."o As per Professor Michael McConnell, so long as a
particular religious practice or religiously inspired conduct did not
threaten public "peace and safety,"" it must be allowed, and
governmental encroachment thereupon must yield.' 2
The divide between the two perspectives is most vividly illustrated
when it comes to neutral laws of general applicability; in other words,
laws that do not target religion specifically, and are generally applicable
to everyone.
Take, for example, laws against the use of controlled substances,
such as peyote. These laws are not targeted against any particular
religion, and apply to all Americans equally. Consider, however, how
these laws affect those members of the Native American Church that use
peyote sacramentally-ingesting it as part of ritualized worship." A law
against peyote's use would certainly interfere with the free exercise of
such persons' religion. Should the First Amendment offer any relief
from such a law to those whose religious worship is infringed
thereupon? In other words, should the First Amendment require, in such
instances, an exemption from compliance with that law on the part of
certain religious adherents, given how the law infringes upon their free
exercise of religion?

8.

Rend Reyes, The Fading Free Evercise Clause, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 738-

40(2011).
9. Id.
10.
Religion,
11.
12.

Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1461 (1990).
Id. at 1466.
For a more extensive discussion of this debate see Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private

Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 27-47 (2013).
13. See Autumn Gray, Note, Effects of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments on Criminal Law: Will Peyotism Eat Away at the ControlledSubstances Act?, 22 AM.

J. CRIM. L. 769, 772-73 (1995).
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This was the exact question that came before the Supreme Court in
Employment Division v. Smith. 14 In an opinion that garnered a fivejustice majority, Justice Scalia wrote that the First Amendment does not
afford any protection from government action such as this." Were it
otherwise, Justice Scalia feared that each citizen would become "a law
unto himself.""
To account for precedent in which relief was granted to religious
adherents in arguably analogous situations, Justice Scalia introduced the
notion of "hybrid" free exercise claims, where "the Free Exercise Clause
[was implicated] in conjunction with other constitutional protections."
Only in these situations, Justice Scalia asserted, can a religious
claimant be judicially exempted from the demands of a neutral law of
general applicability."
Were our discussion of Smith to stop here, America's reputation as
a sanctuary of religious liberty might fairly be called into question.' 9
Admittedly, both in the eighteenth century and our own twentyfirst century, simple freedom from unjust persecution on account of
one's religion is itself a laudable accomplishment and not to be
taken for granted.20 But America's embrace of this "First Freedom" was
typically viewed as more robust than that.2 ' Toward that end, it is
important to note that Justice Scalia acknowledged, in Smith, the
important role of "legislative accommodations" in American history.
Legislative accommodations afford the political process an opportunity
to provide further protections of religious conduct and activity than that
which the Constitution strictly compels.23 The sacramental use of peyote,

14. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
15. Id at 878-79.
16. Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
17. Id. at 881.
18. Id.
19. Cf John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
ConstitutionalExperiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 374 (1996) ("The Court's entire record
on religious liberty has become vilified for its lack of consistent and coherent principles and its
uncritical use of mechanical tests and empty metaphors.").
20. See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why
the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 976-79 (2013); Doug Bandow,
Religious Persecutionand Hostility on the Rise: The First Freedom Is Under Global Siege, FORBES

(Mar.

17,

2015,

7:00 AM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/03/17/religious-

persecution-and-hostility-on-the-rise-the-first-freedom-is-under-global-siege/#3b3fl 1 f64f00
("[F]our of five people around the world lack the freedom to worship and live faithfully.").

21. See Witte, supra note 19, at 388-405.
22. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
23. Id
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Justice Scalia observed, is indeed accommodated in the drug laws of
many states.24
The dissent in Smith, authored by Justice Blackmun, was vigorous.
He argued in favor of the more robust interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, pursuant to which even a neutral law of general applicability
could be abrogated were it to substantially impair an individual's free
exercise of religion. 25 More specifically, the dissent argued that in such
contexts, the law would only pass constitutional muster-as applied to
the objecting, religious adherent-if it were "justified by a compelling
[government] interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means."26
The Smith decision was widely panned by a broad spectrum of
commentators, prompting Congress to pass, by a wide bipartisan margin,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 27 The RFRA
is popularly read as an attempt to reverse Smith, but should more
accurately be read as accepting Smith's invitation to promulgate
"legislative accommodations" to provide religious liberty protection
beyond that demanded by the Constitution. 28 For the RFRA is, in
essence, a global legislative accommodation of religion, pursuant to
which any government action, even one of "general applicability," that
"substantially burden[s] a person's exercise of religion" must yield as
applied to the complaining party unless the government bears the burden
of proving that its action "is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest. "29
The RFRA was subsequently challenged in the courts, and upheld
in City of Boerne v. Flores,30 as constitutional as applied to the federal
government, but unconstitutional as applied to state governments."
Significantly, in City of Boerne, Justice Breyer, who remains on the
Court today, signed on to a dissent authored by Justice O'Connor, which
argued that Smith was wrongly decided. Thus, as the Court stands in
2017, one sitting Justice-Kennedy-signed on to the Smith decision,

24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

26.
27.

Id
42 U.S.C.

§ 2000bb

(2012); Joshua Dorner, Religious Liberty fbr Some or Religious

Liberty for All?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 2 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp2
content/uploads/ 0 13/12/ReligiousLiberty.pdf.
28. Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise

Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 96 (1996).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)--(b).
30. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
31. See id. at 534-36.
32. Id. at 544-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and another sitting Justice-Breyer-has questioned that decision's
correctness. None of the other seven Justices-Alito, Roberts, Thomas,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch-have explicitly opined
on the matter.
A matter of considerable interest is how Justice Scalia fares
compared to his fellow Justices with regard to their treatment of
legislative accommodations, including the RFRA. For whereas Justice
Scalia interpreted the Free Exercise Clause narrowly, he has not
hesitated to uphold and enforce legislative accommodations. Viewed
grossly, this appears to be somewhat paradoxical: in Smith, Justice
Scalia ruled against the religious claimant;" in subsequent religious
liberty cases, Justice Scalia ruled-or, in the case of a dissent, made it
clear that he would have ruled-in favor of the religious claimants.34
Some of Justice Scalia's liberal counterparts exhibited a similar
paradox, but in reverse. Consider Justices Breyer and Blackmun, each of
whom was referenced earlier. Whereas each of these Justices opposed
the Smith decision-and as such would have favored a more robust
protection of religious liberty under the Constitution per se-each also
more frequently opposed legislative efforts to accommodate religion.
Justice Breyer opposed the applicability of RFRA in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores,35 and Justice Blackmun opposed New York's attempt to
accommodate the unique educational needs of a particular Hasidic
community in Kirvas Joel v. Grumet." In each case, Justice Scalia,
conversely, sided with the religious claimant.
Another interesting observation can be gleaned from the cases
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California,
Hastings College of Law v. Martinez38 and Locke v. Davev3 9-decided in

2010 and 2004, respectively. In each of these cases, claimants argued
that they had been selectively discriminated against on grounds that were
religious in nature.40 In Locke, the plaintiff complained about a
scholarship program that was open to all except those who would use the
33. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
34. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.. 134
S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014): Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 423, 439 (2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713-14 (2005); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grument, 512 U.S. 687, 732 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The exception to
this trend was in City of Boerne where Scalia agreed with the majority that RFRA violated the
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the states. See City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 536.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

134 S. Ct. at 2806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
512 U.S. at 711-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759: Kirvas Joel, 512 U.S. at 752 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
561 U.S. 661 (2010).
540 U.S. 712 (2004).

40.

Christian Legal Soc 'v, 561 U.S. at 675; Locke, 540 U.S. at 717-18.
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funds to pursue a degree in divinity.41 In Christian Legal Society, the
plaintiffs challenged a state university's decision to adopt an "allcomers" policy with respect to student organizations, suspiciously on
the heels of-and arguably in response to-a religious student
group's promulgation of a rule limiting membership to co-religionists. 4 2
Both sets of plaintiffs asserted, among other things, that their free
exercise rights, as set forth under the First Amendment, had been
infringed upon.43
In light of the 1990 Smith decision, the plaintiffs in Christian Legal
Society and Locke could not readily seek relief from the applicable law,
as it appeared to be a neutral law of general applicability.44 Rather, in
order to prevail, the plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that the government
action in question was not neutral at all: that it operated, by design, to
the detriment of religious adherents.4 5 In each of these cases, Justice
Scalia was with the dissenters who would have found a First
Amendment violation.46 He saw exactly the kind of unequal, unfair
mistreatment that the Free Exercise Clause, even in its anemic, postSmith form, does actually protect against. His more liberal counterparts,
however-including the aforementioned Justices Stevens and Breyerdid not find any such defect on the record before them.47 So once again
we are confronted with the apparently anomalous approaches toward
religious liberty of Justice Scalia on the one hand and Justices Stevens
and Breyer on the other: Justice Scalia, who interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause narrowly in Smith, was more willing to find the
Clause violated in subsequent cases than his colleagues Justices Stevens
and Breyer, who argued for a broader interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause yet were less willing to find it violated in cases
subsequent to Smith.
Although it is not easy to reconcile the decisions taken by Justices
Stevens and Breyer in the religious liberty cases referenced above (and,
moreover, beyond the scope of this Article), a principled explanation can
be proffered with regard to Justice Scalia's overall approach.
Before attempting any such reconciliation, however, a qualifier is in
order. It should be acknowledged that every case coming before the
41. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715-18.
42. ChristianLegal Soc v, 561 U.S. at 668, 675.
43. Id. at 668 Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.
44. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. ofOr. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
45. See Christian Legal Soc'v, 561 U.S. at 675; Locke, 540 U.S. at 720.
46. Christian Legal Soc'y, 561 U.S. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Alito in
dissent were Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas); Locke, 540 U.S. at 726
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. See ChristianLegal Soc 'v, 561 U.S. at 696-97; Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
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Court is unique and implicates a number of interwoven issues. And for
that reason, the paradoxes suggested above may well be overstated, if
not completely illusory. For example, in Hobby Lobby, Justice Breyer's
primary objection to the majority opinion was how it extended RFRA's
protections to for-profit enterprises.4 8 Similar confounding factors might
well be present in each of the cases discussed previously. And the
sample size is, admittedly, small. But the general impression of paradox
with respect to religious liberty cases indeed remains.
With regard to Justice Scalia's apparently paradoxical thinking on
the subject, a clear logic can be discerned as follows.
In Smith, claimants demanded the creation of a judicial exemption
from a law of general applicability. In the subsequent cases referenced
above, claimants instead sought to enforce the terms of legislative
accommodations from a law of general applicability. This difference is a
critical one in Justice Scalia's thinking, as he viewed the judge's role in
the American republic as one limited to the interpretation and
enforcement of the laws. The making of laws, on the other hand,
involves important value judgments properly left to the political process
in Justice Scalia's opinion.49 To quote one commentator: "[Justice
Scalia] believes lawmakers-i.e., Congress-should be guided by moral
values . .. but that the law has 'no room' for judges to inject their
personal moral sentiments."so As such, Justice Scalia was reticent to read
free exercise exemptions into the Constitution, and wished to eschew
the temptation to constitutionalize his own policy preferences by
favoring one religion's practices over another's, or disfavoring one
particular law of general applicability vis-a-vis another. The far safer
path, to Justice Scalia, was to interpret the Free Exercise Clause
narrowly, in such a manner as to prevent him, or other Justices, from
reading into the constitutional religious liberty protections that go
beyond those supported by the text, regardless of how laudable those
protections might be.
Justice Scalia was, however, quite comfortable deferring
the question of religious exemptions to the general public, when decided
as
"legislative
organs
of government
by the
appropriate
accommodations.""1 One reason for Justice Scalia's comfort in this

48. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2806 (2014) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
49. The promulgation of an exception to a law could certainly be considered a form of
lawmaking.
50. Antony Barone Kolenc, "Mr. Scalia's Neighborhood": A Home for Minority Religions?,
81 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 819, 828 (2007).
51. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990).
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regard, in contrast to that of some of his more liberal colleagues, would
appear to be his understanding of the Establishment Clause.
As with the Free Exercise Clause, scholars and commentators have
divided upon the true purpose and effect of the Establishment Clause. To
some, the Establishment Clause erects a sturdy wall of separation
between church and state, and vigilantly guards against any undue
collaboration between the two. 2 To others, the Establishment Clause
merely prohibits the government from "establishing" an official church
of its own-such as the Church of England. 3 Justice Scalia's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause put him closer to this second
school of thought.5 ' As such, he did not find problematic efforts on the
part of government to collaborate with, endorse, or otherwise be
supportive of religion on a non-sectarian, generic basis." As such,
whereas some of his more liberal colleagues scrutinized legislative
accommodations as possible violations of the Establishment Clause,
Justice Scalia was not overly concerned with this.5 ' As Justice Scalia
wrote in his dissenting opinion in Kiityas Joel: "When a legislature acts
to accommodate religion, particularly a minority sect, 'it follows the best
of our traditions."'"5 He added that the Court's majority, in striking
down a legislative accommodation in that case, "turn[s] the
Establishment Clause into a repealer of our Nation's tradition of
religious toleration."8
In sum, therefore, Justice Scalia's approach to religious liberty was
nuanced but principled. Perhaps ever fearful of reading his own policy
preferences into the Constitution, he interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
narrowly, as permitting legislative accommodations of religion, but not
requiring judicial exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability.
He also interpreted the Establishment Clause narrowly, eschewing a
construction, which, so often in practice, makes the Clause somewhat
hostile toward religion. As such, he was quicker than some of his more
liberal colleagues to uphold generous legislative accommodations of

52. William J. Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall
of Separationor Benign NetOraiNv?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 1 1-12 (1984).

53.

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-50 (2004) (Thomas, J.,

concurring).

54. See McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893-94 (2005) (Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).
55. See id. at 894.

56. Compare Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grutnent, 512 U.S. 687. 690
(1994), with AceCrearv CrY.. 545 U.S. at 889, 891-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57.

Kirvas.Joel, 5 12 U.S. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S.

306, 314 (1952)).
58. Id. at 752.
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religion, seeing them as proper expressions of the popular will via the
legislative process, and posing no conflict with the Establishment
Clause. This approach is indeed internally consistent, eminently
reasonable, and completely justifiable given the text and history of the
First Amendment. It is, most of all, uniquely "Scalian."
The future of religious liberty in a post-Scalia world is difficult to
predict with precision. The election of President Trump, and the
appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court-a dependable
defender of religious liberty during his tenure on the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals 5 9-suggests that for the foreseeable future at least, religious
liberty protections in the United States are unlikely to wane. However,
there is reason to believe that religious liberty might actually be
significantly augmented in Justice Scalia's absence under present
circumstances. And this is because Justice Scalia's Smith decision might
not survive his passing.
Recall that only two Justices on the Court have firmly staked out a
position with regard to Smith: Justice Kennedy, who signed on to the

decision, and Justice Breyer, who denounced it.0 o There is, therefore, no
obvious majority on the Court in favor of Smith. Recall also the
successful rhetoric of the supporters of same-sex marriage, who argued
that "fundamental" rights ought not to be left up to voters or legislatures
to decide, but rather must be recognized via judicial fiat as a matter of
constitutional interpretation.6 1 Thanks to the Smith decision, religious
liberty, America's "First Freedom," is indeed largely a matter subject to
plebiscite. This may not sit well with most Justices; they may not share
Justice Scalia's view that the Free Exercise Clause largely leaves the
protection of religious liberty to the democratic process. In their review
of the historical record and the Court's own jurisprudence on the matter,
they may find that the Clause does indeed have real teeth. With a
reversal of Smith, judicial exemptions could overtake legislative
exemptions as the primary means by which religious conscience and
practice is protected.
A reversal of Smith would have still more profound consequences.
For unlike RFRA, a reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause would apply to
59.

See Sean R. Janda, Judge Gorsuch and Free Exercise, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 118,

118-22 (2017).
60. As of this writing, Justice Kennedy is eighty-one years old and rumored to be
contemplating retirement. See Fearing Trump s Next Move, Liberals Urge Justice Kennedy to Stay,
NBC NEWS (June 3, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/fearing-trump-snext-move-liberals-urge-justice-kennedy-stay-n76773 1.
61. Brianne J. Gorod, Why the Constitution Trumps Any State's Ban on Same-Sex Marriage,
NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/121623/constitution-not-votersshould-have-final-say-gay-marriage.
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state law and state governments, and not only federal law. The
contraceptive mandate cases against the Affordable Care Act
notwithstanding, 62 it is at the state level where most conflicts between
law and religion occur, and where most free exercise litigation
takes place."
Justice Scalia embraced a religious liberty jurisprudence that
generally rejected constitutionally mandated judicial exemptions, but
simultaneously embraced legislative accommodations. Although in
1990, when Smith was decided, the clear consensus in America was that
religious exercise was worthy of protection,64 that consensus has largely
dissipated by 2017.65 As such, the legislatively-based religious liberty
protections that Justice Scalia most likely assumed would persist when
Smith was decided are now no longer certain to long endure.
Consequently, whether the free exercise of religion will remain
America's "First Freedom" well into the twenty-first century may well
depend upon whether the cornerstone of Justice Scalia's religious liberty
jurisprudence, his decision in Smith, is ultimately abandoned.

62.

Young Conaway Stargatt, Next Wave of ACA

Lawsuits Challenges Contraceptive

Mandate, 17 No. 12 DEL. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (2012).
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